Tiempo, Historia y Providencia en la Filosofía de Nicolás de Cusa by Aleksander, Jason
 
Time, History, and Providence in the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa 
Tiempo, Historia y Providencia en la Filosofía de Nicolás de Cusa 
Tempo, História e Providência na Filosofia de Nicolau de Cusa 
Jason ALEKSANDER1 
 
 
Resumo: Embora Nicholas de Cusa ocasionalmente tenha discutido que o 
Universo deva ser entendido como o desdobramento do absolutamente infinito de 
tempo, ele deixou perguntas abertas sobre a distinção entre tempo natural e 
tempo histórico, como qualquer noção de tempo poderia depender da natureza 
de providência divina, e como a compreensão dele de providência divina se 
relaciona a outras visões filosóficas tradicionais. A partir de textos nos quais o 
cusano discutiu estas questões, esse artigo tentará explicitar como Nicolau de 
Cusa entendeu a providência divina. O artigo também discutirá como a visão 
do cusano sobre a providência poderia explicar a contribuição da filosofia do 
Renascimento ao desenvolvimento histórico de uma secularizada filosofia de 
História. 
 
Abstract: Although Nicholas of Cusa occasionally discussed how the universe 
must be understood as the unfolding of the absolutely infinite in time, he left 
open questions about any distinction between natural time and historical time, 
how either notion of time might depend upon the nature of divine providence, 
and how his understanding of divine providence relates to other traditional 
philosophical views. From texts in which Cusanus discussed these questions, 
this paper will attempt to make explicit how Cusanus understood divine 
providence. The paper will also discuss how Nicholas of Cusa’s view of the 
question of providence might shed light on Renaissance philosophy’s 
contribution in the historical transition in Western philosophy from an overtly 
theological or eschatological understanding of historical time to a secularized 
or naturalized philosophy of history. 
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Nicholas of Cusa does not frequently use the term providentia. Across noun cases, 
there are 67 occurrences of the term in the Opera omnia.2 Of these 67 
occurrences, there are 40 in Nicholas’s speculative works and 27 in his sermons.3 
But of the 40 occurrences in the speculative works, 32 are concentrated in four 
works, with nine occurrences in De concordantia catholica, fifteen in De docta 
ignorantia I.22, and four in each De visione Dei 4 and De venatione sapientiae 20-21. 
 
It strikes me as perplexing, that, in the work of a Catholic philosopher so 
pervasively concerned with the way in which the human intellect is positioned 
on the horizon4 between the created world and the eternal from which it is 
                                                 
2 Latin references to the works of NICHOLAS OF CUSA are to Nicolai de Cusa Opera omnia 
iussu et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Heigelbergensis ad codicum fidem edita as reproduced by the 
Cusanus Portal of the Institute for Cusanus Research at the University of Trier 
(http://www.cusanus-portal.de/). Translations of De docta ignorantia and De vision Dei are 
those of H. Lawrence BOND in Nicholas of Cusa: Selected Spiritual Writings (Mahwah, NJ: 
Paulist Press, 1997); unless noted otherwise, translations of all other primary sources are 
those of Jasper HOPKINS in Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Nicholas of Cusa, 
2 vol. (Minneapolis: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 2001). Section references for all works 
follow the Opera omnia. 
3 These statistics were gathered through a word search in the online Cusanus Portal of the 
Institute for Cusanus Research at the University of Trier. The sermons in which the term 
occurs are: 14, 18, 67, 103 (three times), 116, 134 (three times), 149, 183, 187, 193, 196 
(twice), 222, 230, 242 (twice), 243, 246 (twice), 248, 251, 262, 291. In addition to the 
speculative works cited above, the term also occurs in: De coniecturis, Apologia doctae ignoratiae, 
Idiota de mente, De theologicis complementis, De principio, De li non aliud (twice), and the 
Compendium.  
4 For instance: “Spiritus autem intellectualis, cuius operatio est supra tempus quasi in 
horizonte aeternitatis, quando se ad aeterna convertit, non potest ipsa in se convertere, cum 
sint aeterna et incorruptibilia. Sed nec ipse, cum sit incorruptibilis, ita se in ipsa convertit, ut 
desinat esse intellectualis substantia; sed convertitur in ipsa, ut absorbeatur in similitudinem 
aeternorum, secundum gradus tamen, ut magis ad ipsa et ferventius conversus magis et 
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unfolded, Nicholas offers so little explicit discussion of the extent to which this 
horizon functions through or in relationship to divine providence (and this 
peculiarity is all the more surprising in light of Nicholas’ deep indebtedness to 
the thought of St. Augustine of Hippo). Nevertheless, the concept of divine 
providence is itself historically significant, so it is my hope that discussing 
Nicholas’ understanding of providence will also help understand his historical 
significance.  
 
Almost all discussions of providence involve a beginning, and, in conformity with 
tradition, the eastern horizon of my discussion of providence in Nicholas’ 
philosophy is the De docta ignorantia of 1440.5 Here, in a chapter titled “How the 
Providence of God Unites Contradiction,” Nicholas defines providence in 
relation to his familiar metaphors of complicatio (enfolding) and explicatio (unfolding) 
by explaining that 
 
Et quoniam ex prioribus manifestum est Deum esse omnium complicationem, 
etiam contradictoriorum, unc nihil potest eius effugere providentiam; sive enim 
fecerimus aliquid sive eius oppositum aut nihil, totum in Dei providentia 
implicitum fuit. Nihil igitur nisi secundum Dei providentiam eveniet…. Ita Dei 
providentia infinita complicat tam ea, quae evenient, quam quae non evenient, sed 
evenire possunt, et contraria, sicut genus complicat contrarias differentias. Et ea, 
quae scit, non scit cum differentia temporum, quia non scit futura ut futura, nec 
praeterita ut praeterita, sed aeterne et mutabilia immutabiliter (De docta ignorantia, 
I.22.67-68). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
profundius ab aeternis perficiatur et abscondatur eius esse in ipso aeterno esse.” 
(“However, when an intellectual spirit, whose operation is above time and, as if on eternity’s 
horizon, turns toward eternal things, it cannot convert them into itself, because they are 
eternal and incorruptible. But because it in itself is incorruptible, it is not converted into 
them so that it ceases to be an intellectual substance; rather, it is concerted in them in such 
a way that it is absorbed into a likeness of eternal things. However, this occurs in degrees, 
so that the more fervently an intellectual spirit is turned toward eternal things, the more 
thoroughly it is perfected by them and the more profoundly its being is hidden in the 
eternal being itself” De docta ignorantia, III.9.236, my emphasis).  
5 Although De concordantia catholica (1433-1434) was written well before De docta ignorantia, De 
docta ignorantia is traditionally understood as inaugurating Nicholas’ speculative philosophy. 
Moreover, Nicholas does not provide a sustained discussion of providence in the De 
concordantia catholica; in fact, about half of the occurrences of the term in it occur in 
Nicholas’ quotations or paraphrases from other sources, and all of the occurrences are 
scattered throughout the work. Consequently, I will be focusing primarily on the 
occurrences in De docta ignorantia, De visione Dei, and De venatione sapientiae. 
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4 
(Since, as the preceding has shown, God is the enfolding of all things, even of 
contradictories, nothing is able to escape God’s providence. Whether we have 
done one thing or its opposite or nothing at all, everything has been enveloped in 
the providence of God. Nothing, therefore, will happen except according to 
God’s providence…. In this way the infinite providence of God enfolds both the 
things that will happen and also those that will not but can happen, and it enfolds 
contraries, as a genus enfolds contrary differentiae. And God’s providence does 
not know the things that it knows according to a difference of times, because it 
does not know the future as future nor the past as past, but it knows mutable 
things in eternal and unchanging ways.)  
 
As Hans Blumenberg has noted, this understanding of providence “already 
carries in itself the germ of the return of voluntarism to the concept of creation 
that characterizes [Nicholas’] late phase…. Thus in the Cusan’s early work, 
providence is already referred to the concept of possibility, so that it would 
remain unaltered even if something were to happen that in fact will not 
happen.”6 From this Blumenberg goes on to conclude that, for Nicholas, “the 
individual cannot find a justification of his existence in the concept of 
providence.” 
 
For the moment, I’ll note that I concur with Blumenberg that Nicholas’ 
understanding of providence in this early work already anticipates later 
developments in his metaphysics. However, to assess the extent to which 
Blumenberg may be right in claiming that Nicholas’ articulation of divine 
providence is severed from the question of human self-justification, we must 
first turn to Nicholas’ discussion of providence in chapter four of De visione Dei, 
a chapter that is titled “God’s vision is said to be providence, grace, and eternal 
life.” Here, in the passage that begins the long prayer of the De visione Dei, 
Nicholas compares our self-understanding with respect to divine providence to 
the experience of viewing a portrait of an omnivoyant face that he had sent 
(along with the recently completed De visione Dei) to the Benedictine abbey at 
Tegernsee in 1453 –an experience that, given the references to the east, south, 
then west in the passage quoted below also seems metonymically to link 
metaphors for human vision with images of the movement of the sun:  
 
Accede nunc tu, frater contemplator, ad dei eiconam, et primum te loces ad 
orientem, deinde ad meridiem ac ultimo ad occasum; et quia visus eiconae te 
aeque undique respicit et non deserit, quocumque pergas, in te excitabitur 
                                                 
6 The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert M. WALLACE (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 1983), p. 522. 
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5 
speculatio provocaberisque et dices: Domine, nunc in hac tua imagine 
providentiam tuam quadam sensibili experientia intueor. Nam si me non deseris, 
qui sum vilissimus omnium, nusquam cuiquam deeris. (De visione Dei, 4.9) 
 
(Now, brother contemplative, approach the icon of God. First stand to the east, 
then to the south, and finally to the west. And because the icon’s gaze regards you 
equally everywhere and does not leave you wherever you may go, a contemplation 
will arise in you, and you will be stirred saying: “Lord, in this image of you I now 
behold your providence by a certain sensible experience. For if you do not 
abandon me, the vilest of all, you will never abandon anyone. Indeed, you are 
present to all and to each, just as being, without which they cannot exist, is 
present to all and to each.”) 
 
This way of experiencing oneself in the divine vision, Nicholas goes on to claim, 
provides a way to recognize why all beings prefer the perfections most suitable 
to them,  
 
Ita enim tu, domine, intueris quodlibet, quod est, ut non possit concipi per omne 
id, quod est, te aliam curam habere, quam ut id solum sit meliori modo, quo esse 
potest, atque quod omnia alia, quae sunt, ad hoc solum sint, ut serviant ad id, 
quod illud sit optime, quod tu respicis. (De visione Dei, 4.9) 
 
(For you, Lord, so look on anything that exists that no existing thing can conceive 
that you have any other care but that it alone exist in the best manner possible for 
it and that all other existing things exist only for the purpose of serving the best 
state of the one which you are beholding.) 
 
Thus it is through our awareness of pro-videntia that we are led to the 
recognition that in the videndi or visione of God  
 
Ubi est hortus deliciarum omnium, quae desiderari poterunt, quo nihil melius non 
solum per omnem hominem aut angelum excogitari, sed nec omni essendi modo 
esse potest. Nam est ipsa absoluta maximitas omnis desiderii rationalis, quae 
maior esse nequit. (De visione Dei, 4.12) 
 
(Here is the source of all the delights that can be desired. Nothing better can be 
thought by any human being or angel, and nothing better can exist by any mode 
of being, for this source is the absolute maximumness, unable to be greater, of 
every rational desire.) 
 
And, if we turn to the western horizon of Nicholas’ late writings, in the De 
venatione sapientiae of 1463, we see that this understanding of divine providence 
remains a feature of his thinking, though he now spells out more explicitly than 
 
COSTA, Ricardo da e SANTOS, Bento Silva (orgs.). Mirabilia 19 (2014/2) 
Nicolau de Cusa (1401-1464) em Diálogo 
Nicolás de Cusa (1401-1464) en Diálogo 
Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) in Dialogue 
Jun-Dez 2014/ISSN 1676-5818 
 
6 
in the above passage from the De visione Dei what it is that divine providence 
provides for humans striving to live in the best possible manner for themselves:  
 
Divina enim providentia, sicut non deficit in necessariis, ita non habundat in 
superfluis… Quare, cum homo secundum intellectualem animam laudabilia 
naturaliter cognoscat et amplectatur delicieturque in illis tamquam in cibo naturae 
suae conformi, hinc scit se de his naturaliter esse, quae ob conformitatem 
naturalem ad suum esse laudat et amplectitur. Habet igitur intellectus in se dono 
divinae providentiae omnem sibi necessariam scientiam principiorum, per quae 
venatur suae naturae conforme, et infallibile est hoc iudicium. (De venatione 
sapientiae, 20.57) 
 
(For just as Divine Providence does not stint with regard to things that are 
necessities, so it does not lavish with regard to things that are superfluities… 
Therefore, since in accordance with his intellectual soul man naturally knows 
praiseworthy things and embraces them and delights in them as in food 
compatible with his nature, he knows that he naturally exists from those things 
which he praises and embraces on account of their natural compatibility with his 
own being. Therefore, by the gift of Divine Providence the intellect has within 
itself all the knowledge-of-principles that is necessary for it [to have]. By means of 
these principles the intellect pursues what is compatible with its nature, and its 
judgment [in this respect] is infallible.) [emendations are Hopkins’] 
  
All of these passages concerning divine providence, I think, raise precisely the 
question opened for us by the remark from Blumenberg regarding the human 
capacity for self-justification in its recognition of divine providence. Returning 
for a moment to the discussion of providence in chapter four of the Dei visione 
Dei, Nicholas has described an experience in which a person arrives at a state of 
blessedness through the contemplation of “eternal life in a mirror, in an icon, in 
an enigma” (“in speculo, in eicona, in aenigmate vitam aeternam” De visione Dei, 
4.12). 
 
 Thus, the soul’s recognition of its eternal nature that is the precondition for its 
blessedness is in some way dependent upon temporal action, which is to say that 
Nicholas maintains that blessedness is dependent both upon an unfolding of our 
own will through time and the enfolding of sensation in the soul’s recognition of 
its eternality. As he puts it in this same chapter, 
 
Dedisti mihi, domine, esse et id ipsum tale, quod se potest gratiae et bonitatis tuae 
continue magis capax reddere. Et haec vis, quam a te habeo, in qua virtutis 
omnipotentiae tuae vivam imaginem teneo, est libera voluntas, per quam possum 
aut ampliare aut restringere capacitatem gratiae tuae; ampliare quidem per 
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conformitatem, quando nitor esse bonus, quia tu bonus, quando nitor esse iustus, 
quia tu iustus, quando nitor esse misericors, quia tu misericors, quando non nisi 
omnis conatus meus est ad te conversus, quia omnis conatus tuus est ad me 
converses. (De visione Dei, 4.11.) 
 
(O Lord, you have given me being of such kind that it can make itself ever more 
capable to receive your grace and goodness. And this power, which I hold from 
you and in which I possess a living image of your almighty power, is free will. By 
it I can increase or restrict my capacity for your grace. I am able to increase it 
through conformity, when I strive to be good because you are good, [strive] to be 
just because you are just, and [strive] to be merciful because you are merciful, 
when all my striving is turned only toward you because all [your striving (conatus 
tuus)] is turned toward me.) [my emendations] 
 
However, in De filiatione Dei (1445), a work composed well before the De visione 
Dei, Nicholas has already indicated how such an understanding must raise a 
concern with the temporal means of producing such an experience.  
 
Admonemur nos, qui ad filiationem dei aspiramus, non inhaerere sensibilibus, 
quae sunt aenigmatica signa veri, sed ipsis ob infirmitatem nostram absque 
adhaesione coinquinationis ita uti, quasi per ipsa nobis loquatur magister veritatis 
et libri sint mentis eius expressionem continentes. Et tunc in sensibilibus 
contemplabimur intellectualia et ascendemus quadam improportionali 
comparatione de transitoriis et fluidis temporalibus, quorum esse est in instabili 
fluxu, ad aeterna, ubi rapta est omnis successio in fixam quietis permanentiam, et 
vacabimus circa speculationem verae, iustae et gaudiosae vitae separantes nos ab 
omni inquinamento deorsum se trahente, ut possimus cum ardenti desiderio 
studii circa ipsum eam ipsam vitam magistrali adeptione hinc absoluti introire. (De 
filiatione Dei, II.61) 
 
(We who aspire unto being God’s sons are admonished not to cling to sensible 
objects, which are symbolic signs of the true, but rather, because of our infirmity, 
to use these objects—without any polluting adherence thereto—in the following 
manner: as if through them the Teacher-of-truth were speaking to us and as if 
they were books containing the expression of His mind. And, in that case, we will 
contemplate intellectual things in and through sensible things; and we will ascend 
[contemplatively], by means of a certain disproportional parallelism, from 
transitory and insubstantial temporal things, whose being is in constant flux, unto 
eternal things, where all succession is caught up into the abiding permanency of 
rest. And we will have leisure for the contemplation of that true, just, and joyous 
life. We will be free from all pollution (which draws us downward), so that with 
ardent desire for learning more of God, and being free from this world, we can 
enter into that life by attaining mastery.) [emendation is Hopkins’] 
 
COSTA, Ricardo da e SANTOS, Bento Silva (orgs.). Mirabilia 19 (2014/2) 
Nicolau de Cusa (1401-1464) em Diálogo 
Nicolás de Cusa (1401-1464) en Diálogo 
Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) in Dialogue 
Jun-Dez 2014/ISSN 1676-5818 
 
8 
This emphasis on the temporalized experience through which a human being 
strives to realize its contemplative potentiality seems to situate Nicholas 
somewhere between an Aristotelian understanding of eudaimonia –a happiness 
that is limited to the extent that humans, insofar as they are human, always need 
external resources of the temporal world, even for contemplation– and the 
traditional Christian/Plotinian neo-Platonic emphasis on the soul’s ontological 
condition as emanated from a transcendent divine intellect. 
 
But, what I think is more significant is the way in which Nicholas of Cusa’s 
thinking here may be understood as a barometer of historical transformation in 
Renaissance thought. It is significant that Nicholas of Cusa’s understanding can 
be compared with its predecessors in the Western philosophical tradition since 
the Renaissance partly accomplishes an historical transformation in Western 
thought by turning to what it regarded (and imagined) as a priscus for its 
articulation of (a Christian) humanitas.  
 
I will say more about the question of Nicholas’ historical significance toward the 
end of this paper, but at this point it is necessary first to note that it is precisely 
because of this temporal condition of striving (conatus), that Nicholas of Cusa’s 
philosophy opens onto an ethical consideration that often seems either absent 
from his writings or buried in the language of his Christology. Or, perhaps, if the 
discussion of providence so far is any indication, it may be fair to say that the 
ethical considerations are present all along but remain largely implicit in his 
thinking. At any rate, to understand how this ethical consideration emerges, it 
will be helpful, I think, to see what separates Nicholas’ understanding of 
providence from traditional articulations of the relationship between human 
history and natural time. 
 
Traditionally (for Christianity, at any rate), divine providence links the ideas the 
possibility of and means to salvation to the ideas of an archaic creation and the 
Fall of man on the one hand and to a final Judgment on the other hand. But 
Nicholas seems to arrive in his late writings –i.e., those composed from 1459 to 
1464– at the conclusion that neither creation nor Judgment can be in, or even at 
the limits of, time.7 In rejecting the traditional Christian understanding of the 
                                                 
7 With regard to Nicholas’ abandonment of a worldly arche, see, for instance, De principio 
(1559) § 11 and, even more tellingly, De venatione sapientiae 39.117: “[Posse fieri] est igitur 
perpetuum, cum habeat initium et annihilari non possit, sed terminus eius sit suum initium” 
(“Therefore it [posse-fieri] is perpetual, since it has a beginning but cannot be annihilated 
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9 
human significance of an historical arche and eschaton, Nicholas flattens any 
distinction between time as a feature of the natural world and human history as 
a feature of our relationship to our own ontological status as created in imago dei. 
So-called “natural time” is nothing but “history;” for Nicholas so-called natural 
time is created by the rational soul as an instrument for its recognition of its 
possibilities for perfection according to its underlying ontological condition, but 
this ontological condition is no longer determined in relation to any single arche 
or eschaton in or at the limits of the world. As he puts it in a well-known passage 
from the De ludo globi of 1463,  
 
Creat anima sua inventione nova instrumenta, ut discernat et noscat, ut 
Ptolomaeus astrolabium et Orpheus lyram et ita de multis. Neque ex aliquo 
extrinseco inventores crearunt illa, sed ex propria mente. Explicarunt enim in 
sensibili materia conceptum. Sic annus, mensis, horae sunt instrumenta mensurae 
temporis per hominem creatae. Sic tempus, cum sit mensura motus, mensurantis 
animae est instrumentum. Non igitur dependet ratio animae a tempore, sed ratio 
mensurae motus, quae tempus dicitur, ab anima rationali dependet; quare anima 
rationalis non est tempori subdita, sed ad tempus se habet anterioriter. (De ludo 
globi, II.94) 
 
(The soul by its own inventiveness creates new instruments in order to discern 
and to know [in the way that] Ptolemy invented the astrolabe, Orpheus invented 
the lyre, and so on. Inventors created these instruments not from something 
extrinsic but from their own minds. For they unfolded their conceptions in a 
[sensible] material. [Thus,] year, month, hours are instruments of a temporal measure 
created by man. Thus, since time is the measure of motion, it is the instrument of 
the measuring soul. Therefore, the soul’s measuring-scale does not depend on 
time; instead, the scale for the measuring of motion –a measuring which is called 
time– depends on the rational soul. Therefore, the rational soul is not subjected 
                                                                                                                                               
and since its end-point is its beginning-point”). With regard to his rejection of any notion 
of a worldly eschaton, Matthieu van der MEER has shown that, in both his sermons and his 
speculative writings, Nicholas’ Christology is linked to an eschatology only until about 
1455, at which time he stops discussing the question of the last days altogether (“World 
without End: Nicholas of Cusa’s View of Time and Eternity”? in Christian Humanism Essays 
in Honour of Arjo Vanderjagt [Brill, 2009], pp. 317-337 at p. 321). Van der Meer claims that 
Nicholas abandons eschatological considerations in both his sermons and his speculative 
works. As a matter of fact, however, the only philosophical work in which Nicholas 
explicitly discusses eschatology is Coniectura de ultimis diebus (1446). But even in this text, van 
der Meer points out, Nicholas cautions: “almost everyone who has written so far about the 
order of times, has been deceived by faulty surmising” (qtd. in Van der Meer p. 321). 
Accordingly, Van der Meer concludes, “Cusanus does not take his own [philosophical] 
speculations very seriously” (p. 321). 
 
COSTA, Ricardo da e SANTOS, Bento Silva (orgs.). Mirabilia 19 (2014/2) 
Nicolau de Cusa (1401-1464) em Diálogo 
Nicolás de Cusa (1401-1464) en Diálogo 
Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) in Dialogue 
Jun-Dez 2014/ISSN 1676-5818 
 
10 
to time; rather, it exists antecedently to time.) [My emendations; emphases are 
Hopkins’] 
 
Reading this passage from De ludo globi in light of the passage from De filiatione 
Dei quoted above thus allows us to see how the ethical dimension of Nicholas’ 
thinking emerges as a conception of the human soul’s hermeneutic freedom –of 
the human potentiality for self-justification in its recognition of the necessity of 
divine providence. Taken in this way, Blumenberg must certainly be regarded as 
simply mistaken in asserting that Nicholas maintains the view that “the 
individual cannot find a justification of his existence in the concept of 
providence”. 
 
And yet, read more charitably, Blumenberg’s comment might be read as a way 
of highlighting the consequence of the fact that, in conceiving divine providence 
as a hermeneutic framework within which human beings confront themselves as 
subjects, Nicholas has nevertheless abandons the traditional mooring of the idea 
of salvation to the idea of final Judgment.  
 
Indeed Blumenberg’s insistence on reading Nicholas’ approach to this issue as a 
“return to volunteerism” tacitly recognizes why Nicholas’ understanding that all 
historical events refer to the same hypostatic union with God in fact generates a 
unique understanding of the role of history –or, what is the same thing for 
Nicholas, of the role of the self-constituting temporality of human reason– as a 
condition for the possibility of salvation. But this point requires a different 
elaboration than Blumenberg offers.8 For Nicholas, all historical events, insofar 
as they are the unfolding of divine providence, are conceptually linked to the 
significance of the Incarnation– though these conceptual links are themselves 
only historically contingent images (or interpretations)9 of the Incarnation. 
                                                 
8 It is not my intention to offer a sustained criticism of Blumenberg’s interpretation of 
Nicholas in this essay. Suffice it to note that I am in general agreement with Elizabeth 
BRIENT’s argument in The Immanence of the Infinite: Hans Blumenberg and the Threshold to 
Modernity (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2002) that Blumenberg’s 
emphasis on what he saw as a predominately nominalist aspect of Nicholas’ philosophy 
caused him to misidentify how this philosophy might indeed be said to expose an epochal 
transformation in the making.  
9 It seems right to think that, for Nicholas, the significance of Incarnation functions through 
accommodative revelation (and, hence, “interpretation” of it through interpretations of our 
own histories would be crucial to our attentiveness to ethical concerns). See, for instance, 
De genesi § 159 regarding the accommodative language of scripture. 
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Thus, to the extent that one might speak of an arche or eschaton for Nicholas, one 
may speak only of an eternal referent for any temporal activity whatsoever –or, 
more precisely, the arche and eschaton of each and every historical unfolding 
derives its significance and self-justification solely in relation to the Incarnation, 
an “event” that is both unfolded in time and yet also enfolds the meanings of all 
other temporal events. 
 
Accordingly, a person (or, if we were to bring a discussion of the De pace fidei or 
Nicholas’ writings on church reform to bear on this question, not just a person 
but also a people) becomes god-like by acting in ways that resemble God. Or, in 
other words, salvation is made possible on the condition that the soul is timeless, 
but because the soul creates time as an instrument for measuring sensations and 
making them significant to its turning to its salvation, the condition for the 
realization of salvation remains thoroughly embedded in the soul’s own self-
constituting temporality.10 
 
It is in view of this conception that it seems to me that Nicholas’ understanding 
of providence is poised to rupture through the idiom of its theological 
articulation into a humanist –perhaps even proto-Kantian– conception of 
freedom and responsibility as linked and grounded in a subjectively sufficient 
representation of the possibility of our own absolute moral worth. This could 
not be clearer, I think, than it is in De visione Dei 7.25-26: 
 
O domine, suavitas omnis dulcedinis, posuisti in libertate mea, ut sim, si voluero, 
mei ipsius. Hinc nisi sim mei ipsius, tu non es meus. Necessitares enim libertatem, 
cum tu non possis esse meus, nisi et ego sim mei ipsius. Et quia hoc posuisti in 
libertate mea, non me necessitas, sed exspectas, ut ego eligam mei ipsius esse. Per 
me igitur stat, non per te, domine, qui non contrahis bonitatem tuam maximam, 
sed largissime effundis in omnes capaces…. Tu me doces, ut sensus oboediat 
rationi et ratio dominetur. Quando igitur sensus servit rationi, sum mei ipsius. Sed 
non habet ratio, unde dirigatur, nisi per te, domine, qui es verbum et ratio 
rationum. Unde nunc video, si audiero verbum tuum, quod in me loqui non 
cessat et continue lucet in ratione, ero mei ipsius, liber et non servus peccati. 
                                                 
10 Is it going too far to say that time is an instrument of the soul and that the most 
important function of this instrument is its relationship to our ethical condition? In any 
case, see De venatione sapientiae 37.108 concerning the notion that no created being can 
realize all of its possibilities in a single moment in time; the example that Nicholas uses is 
Plato, who, according to Nicholas, does not maximize the nature of man. For Nicholas, of 
course, only Christ is the contracted maximum, but Christ is not created in same the sense 
in which the unfolded world is created. 
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(O Lord, the Sweetness of every delight, you have placed within my freedom that 
I be of my own if I am willing. Hence, unless I am my own, you are not mine, for 
you would [compel] my freedom since you cannot be mine unless I also am mine. 
And since you have placed this in my freedom, you do not [compel] me, but you 
wait for me to choose to be my own. This depends on me and not on you, O 
Lord, for you do not limit your maximum goodness but lavish it on all who are 
able to receive it…. You teach me that sense should obey reason and that reason 
should be lord and master. When, therefore, sense serves reason, I am my own. 
[But one does not have reason from which one is directed] except through you, 
O Lord, who are the Word and the Reason of reasons. I see now that if I listen to 
your Word, which does not cease to speak in me and which continually shines 
forth in my reason, I will be my own, free and not the slave of sin.) [my 
emendations] 
 
So, in short, it seems significant to me that we find in Nicholas’ understanding 
of divine providence the kind of historical thinking that appears to resemble the 
philosophies of history at work in Kant and Hegel. I don’t mean to suggest that 
Nicholas directly informs these projects; no one has demonstrated to my 
satisfaction that Nicholas was especially influential on the major thinkers 
associated with what is called “modern philosophy”. 
 
However, unless we are to believe that what we call modern philosophy is 
constituted by a sui generis revolution in human thinking (which may –ironically in 
this context– be possible on Nicholas’ own view11), a thinker like Nicholas may 
nevertheless serve as a barometer of transformations in the Renaissance 
intellectual climate that are constitutive of modern philosophy’s historical 
emergence. 
 
Let me therefore end with an offering to the possibility of future discussion and 
judgment: the two quotations below seem to me to suggest an interesting 
parallel between Nicholas and Kant on the question of the relationship between 
the church-militant and the church-triumphant as images that are both related to 
the critical horizon of human reason with respect to the question of its 
fundamental ethical condition. 
 
                                                 
11 Idiota de mente 6.88: “Nescio, an Pythagoricus vel alius sim. Hoc scio, quod nullius 
auctoritas me ducit, etiamsi me movere tentet.” (“I don’t know whether I am a 
Pythagorean or something else. But I do know that no one’s authority guides me, even if it 
attempts to influence me.”) 
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[1] Nam omnis creatura rationalis, in natura humana rationali per gratiam in 
Christo Iesu divinitati hypostaticae unita, gratiam elevationis ad unionem dei, quae 
est ultima felicitas, consequi potest…. Sunt autem homines rationales 
peregrinantes in spe salvationis, quibus revelata est veritas huius gratiae per Christi 
incarnationem. Et hii quidem in fide sunt veritatem agnoscentes et in spe 
exspectantes felicitatem medio caritatis; qui militantem constituunt ecclesiam, 
quae omnia habet per gratiam Iesu Christi quae adhuc sunt necessaria, ut post 
militiam in triumphantem transcendat et beatitudinem in Iesu Christo 
consequatur. Haec quidem ecclesia est, in qua est gratia Iesu explicata secundum 
istius mundi participantem naturam, quia, cum non possit corruptibilis homo 
veritatem intueri ob suae naturae condicionem sine aenigmate et speculo, saltem 
ipsam in aenigmate et speculo seu fide attingat.  
 
(For in rational human nature, every rational creature hypostatically united to 
divinity by grace in Christ Jesus can attain the grace of elevation to union with 
God, which is the ultimate happiness…. There are rational men, however, 
wayfarers in hope of salvation, to whom the truth of this grace was revealed 
through the incarnation of Christ; and these indeed are the men who, 
acknowledging the truth through faith and awaiting in hope the happiness which 
comes through charity, make up the Church Militant, which through the grace of 
Jesus Christ has all things necessary for this, so that, after its military service, it 
may pass over to the Church Triumphant and find blessedness in Jesus Christ. 
This is the Church in which the grace of Jesus is unfolded according to the 
participatory nature of this world, because, although corruptible man, on account 
of the condition of his nature, cannot understand the truth without enigma and 
mirror image, at least he touches it through enigma and mirror image, or faith).12 
 
[2] Das Himmelreich wird zuletzt auch, was die Leitung der Vorsehung betrifft, in 
dieser Geschichte nicht allein als in einer zwar zu gewissen Zeiten verweilten, aber 
nie ganz unterbrochenen Annäherung, sondern auch in seinem Eintritte 
vorgestellt…. Der angeführte Zusatz zur Geschichte der Kirche, der das künftige 
und letzte Schicksal derselben betrifft, stellt diese nun endlich als triumphierend, d.i. 
nach allen überwundenen Hindernissen als mit Glückseligkeit noch hier auf 
Erden bekrönt vor…. Diese Vorstellung einer Geschichtserzählung der 
Nachwelt, die selbst keine Geschichte ist, ist ein schönes Ideal der durch 
Einführung der wahren allgemeinen Religion bewirkten moralischen, im Glauben 
vorausgesehenen Weltepoche, bis zu ihrer Vollendung, die wir nicht als empirische 
Vollendung absehen, sondern auf die wir nur im kontinuierlichen Fortschreiten 
und Annäherung zum höchsten auf Erden möglichen Guten…hinaussehen. 
 
                                                 
12 Nicholas of Cusa, Letter to Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo (May 20, 1442), § 2-3; trans. 
Thomas IZBICKI in Nicholas of Cusa: Writings on Church and Reform (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2008). 
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(As regards its guidance by Providence, the Kingdom of Heaven is finally 
represented in this history not only as coming nearer, in an approach delayed 
indeed at certain times yet never entirely interrupted, but as being ushered in as 
well…. The addition to the history of the church that deals with its future final 
destiny represents it, however, as finally triumphant, i.e., as crowned with happiness 
here on earth, after having overcome all obstacles…. This representation in a 
historical narrative of the future world, which is not itself history, is a beautiful 
ideal of the moral world-epoch brought about by the introduction of the true 
universal religion and foreseen in faith in its completion –one which we do not see 
directly in the manner of an empirical completion, but have a glimpse of in the 
continuous advance and approximation toward the highest possible good on 
earth.).13 
 
*** 
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